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Introduction.  When archivists and other records professionals have considered 
the matter of security, they have generally thought of protection of their holdings, 
measures to thwart insider theft, and other approaches to ensure that the records they 
have responsibility for can be used and maintained in ways that guarantee careful control 
and preservation.  Such issues bring to mind security cameras, locks and other protection 
devices, special staff training, carefully prepared policies and procedures, and security 
consultants. 
There is another kind of archival security, however, where efforts are made to 
make sure that documents created by individuals and institutions, especially those with 
some connection to controversial or contentious events, survive to be used in the future.  
This aspect of archival security involves accountability and ethics, topics growing in 
importance in the archival community (and, it seems, in all of the information 
professions).  Matters of accountability and ethics have become more than hypothetical 
issues for working archivists. Increasingly, archivists are confronting issues relating to 
access, ownership, and public policy that challenge traditional attitudes and 
practices. These three cases – the ownership and control of the records of indigenous 
peoples, the use of government records created as part of the normal procedures of the 
Supreme Court, and the misadministration of electronic mail messages generated by the 
White House – provide some illuminating lessons about the kinds of contentious issues 
archivists will increasingly face.  All of them, if improperly handled, threaten to 
eliminate, damage, or weaken the documentary heritage for future generations – that is, 
threaten the security of what constitutes our documentary heritage.  While there may 
seem to be pronounced differences between the claims of indigenous peoples in wanting 
greater respect for their cultural heritage and issues concerning access to or the 
management of government records, all these cases pose substantial threats to how 
archival sources are protected and the well-being of communities in regard to their 
collective memory. 
The purpose of this essay is to confirm that the notion of archival security that 
needs to be considered in the future is best demonstrated through case studies, ones either 
suggesting the need for additional research and reflection or opening up the horizon to 
reveal practical solutions.  Each of the cases described here suggest disturbing barriers for 
archivists and their allies to ensure that there will be a documentary heritage in the future.  
After these cases have been presented a brief set of lessons or themes will be discussed. 
Diminishing Access, or Archival Insecurity.  In a manner, what we are 
considering here is the ethics of access, a topic that has been a regular, some might say 
prominent, topic in the professional literature in the past two decades or more.  Just about 
two decades ago, Elena Danielson commenced her essay on the ethics of access in this 
way: “Providing fair access to archives may appear to be a fundamentally simple 
operation, until one examines specific cases.”1   At that point in time, the cases she could 
mention included the Francis Lowenheim charges against the staff of the Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Presidential Library concerning the alleged withholding of documents, the use 
of Sigmund Freud papers held by the Library of Congress and controlled by his estate, 
the ownership of the Richard Nixon tapes and other presidential records, and so forth. 
Just as Danielson was retelling and reinterpreting the particulars of these well-
known cases, new cases were appearing.  Another case study about the Carl and Anne 
Braden papers at the State Historical Society of Wisconsin was published.  A few years 
earlier the FBI sought to gain access to these papers to defend itself against a lawsuit 
brought by an organization that Anne Braden belonged to; the Braden papers only could 
be used with the permission of the donors, and Anne Braden (her husband had died the 
decade before) refused to grant access.  The FBI subpoenaed the files. According to 
Harold Miller, this was an “unprecedented” case: “While courts had been asked to pen 
restricted public records, they had never before been asked to order access to private 
papers in the hands of an archival repository.”2  The Wisconsin archivists, even with their 
lack of success in persuading the Society of American Archivists to join with them in an 
amicus brief prepared by the Center for Law in the Public Interest, sought to establish the 
legal precedent of “archival privilege” (like the lawyer-client privilege, but in this 
instance between a donor and an archival repository).3  Ultimately, the state historical 
society lost its case, leading to some sobering conclusions about how effectively any 
donated collections could be protected: “Once in an archives the general content of a 
collection, even when restricted, generally becomes public knowledge.  The collection 
thus becomes more likely to be subpoenaed.”4 
By the mid-1990s, enough troublesome cases about archival access had developed  
that some questioned anything they read in basic archival manuals.  Mark Greene, for 
example, opined in 1993 that “To do as the manuals say, and to have the repository take 
on the responsibility of determining what should be restricted, is to place what would 
seem to be an impossible burden on repository staff – that of determining just what 
material does or does not constitute an invasion of privacy or breaches the confidentiality 
of business information across thousands of collections, hundreds of thousands of folders, 
and tens of millions of documents.”5  If matters seemed impossible in 1993, the situation 
might appear even worse today, as intellectual property challenges have become far more 
complicated.  Proprietary control measures, government secrecy, and the porous nature of 
information systems all seem poised to conspire against ensuring the viability of a 
documentary heritage in the future. 
More cases continued to appear reflecting the immensity of the challenges facing 
archivists, seeming to conspire to form a new archival insecurity.  Jodi Allison-Bunnell, 
for example, explored the complicated circumstances of the ownership of the Katherine 
Anne Porter papers at the University of Maryland, all the more problematic since the 
intellectual property rights seemed even to interfere with the efforts to microfilm the 
papers in order to provide more sensible protection of the fragile originals.  Allison-
Bunnell notes that the various court cases “have made literary manuscripts curators 
extremely cautious about providing additional access to the letters of correspondents 
contained in their collections.”6  Not long after that, another case study, this one 
concerning the access to the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission records, further 
emphasized the growing complications of the archival world.  This state agency, existing 
from 1956 to 1973, compiled records on 87,000 people suspected to be supporting the 
civil rights movement in that period.  Like other secret police files, archivists 
administering these records faced heavy problems regarding the implications to innocent 
people in opening the files.  Lisa Speer notes, “Regardless of the context of the 
commission files, the controversy surrounding their disposition illustrates the heavy 
responsibility faced by the courts and the archival community of balancing individual 
privacy rights against the public interest.”7  In this particular instance, Speer suggests that 
this controversy is a “perfect case study of the complexity involved in balancing access 
versus privacy rights with regard to public records.”8 
 
Case One. The Ethics of Archiving Native American Collections: A Look at the 
Protocols for Native American Archival Materials.  In the United States, legislative acts 
protecting antiquities and preserving cultural heritage date back to the early twentieth 
century with the passage of the American Antiquities Act of 1906.  Despite this act, the 
history of collecting, preserving, and displaying artifacts from the Native American tribes 
has a less than ethical past.  In the early days of “smash and grab” archaeology, the rights 
and considerations of those being exploited were of little concern.  The social sciences 
“were conceived in sin: ethics demands that we treat people as subjects; social science 
requires that we view them as objects.”9 Throughout the twentieth century, other such 
acts protecting Native American burials and archaeological sites were passed, but the 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) of 1990 is the most 
significant.  NAGPRA finally gives these “objects” of study a voice and control of their 
cultural heritage.10 
The history of legislation combating mistreatment and misrepresentation of 
Native American objects has made great strides toward protecting and preserving Native 
American cultural heritage. Yet all of this legislation fails to address the care and 
handling of culturally sensitive material held in archives and libraries throughout the 
country.  Documents, moving and still images, transcripts, and sound recordings 
depicting culturally sensitive subjects do not fall under the jurisdiction of NAGPRA.  The 
Protocols for Native American Archival Materials were drafted to “identify best 
professional practices for culturally responsive care and use of American Indian archival 
material held by non-tribal organizations.”11 What are the ethical considerations of 
archiving culturally sensitive material relating to Native Americans and the way in which 
the Protocols address these ethical challenges? 
NAGPRA requires federal institutions that receive funding from the federal 
government to return sacred objects to the Native American group to whom they belong.   
This includes sacred funerary objects, human remains, and other items with significant 
cultural value.  Under NAGPRA legislation, museums and cultural institutions are 
required to inventory their holdings and submit a summary to a NAGPRA Review 
Committee.12 These institutions must then return, or repatriate, the artifacts to the 
culturally affiliated Native American tribes.  NAGPRA also outlaws the trafficking of 
human remains and funerary objects.13 
While nearly two decades of NAGPRA have seen the repatriation of cultural 
items from across the country, culturally sensitive materials remain in libraries and 
archives across America.  Examples of this culturally sensitive material include still and 
moving images of human remains, religious and sacred objects, ceremonies, burials and 
funerals as well as recordings or transcripts of songs or chants, religious or healing 
practices, and personal or family information.  Maps of sacred or religious sites and other 
documentation relating to archaeological data of Native American sites are also 
considered culturally sensitive.14 
The ethical issues concerned with holding this material and making it available to 
anyone to see and use are numerous.  Even among the Native American communities, not 
all of this information would be available for all of the tribe members to see and use and 
“for Native American communities the public release of or access to specialized 
information or knowledge—gathered with and without informed consent—can cause 
irreparable harm.”15 It is not uncommon that this culturally sensitive material was 
gathered without the informed consent of the tribe members or individuals, making 
exploitation of individuals and their knowledge a serious concern.  Finally, the 
perceptions about Native American culture by often non-native archivists may skew the 
historical picture of Native American history, often taking material out of context.16 
In an attempt to address these ethical concerns and create a dialogue between 
communities as well as guidelines for the proper care and handling of culturally sensitive 
material, a group of nineteen Native American and non-Native American archivists, 
librarians, historians, anthropologists, and museum curators recently drafted the 
Protocols for Native American Archival Materials.  The group gathered at Northern 
Arizona University in April 2006 tasked with the mission, and the Protocols were the 
result of that meeting.  The Protocols address: “The recognition of the sovereign 
governments and associated rights of Native American communities; issues in the 
collection, ownership, preservation, handling, access, and use of American Indian 
archival resources; the importance of building relationships, balancing different 
approaches to knowledge management, and mutual respect; the need to expand the nature 
of the information professions to include Native American perspectives and 
knowledge.”17 
These Protocols are unprecedented in the archival and library communities and 
are a show of willingness on the part of the information community to adopt an 
alternative approach to archives as a means of honoring the traditions and values of 
others.18 This ethical self-awareness has been recognized and indorsed by institutions and 
organizations in a variety of disciplines.  The Protocols themselves are based on the laws, 
ethical codes, and international declarations of twelve organizations, including the 
American Anthropological Association, the Society of American Archivists, the 
American Library Association, and the American Association for State and Local 
History.19 
The Protocols address ten areas of concern for dealing ethically with culturally 
sensitive material in archives and offer guidelines for action for archivists and librarians 
as well as for Native American communities.  The Protocols present a real challenge to 
archivists and librarians as they call into question many of the ways in which archivists 
administer their collections.  The ten Protocols are 
Building Relationships of Mutual Respect 
Striving for Balance in Content and Perspectives  
Accessibility and Use  
Culturally Sensitive Materials  
Providing Context 
Native American Intellectual Property Issues 
Copying and Repatriation of Records to Native American Communities 
Native American Research Protocols 
Reciprocal Education and Training 
Awareness of Native American Communities and Issues.20 
While all of the Protocols address issues of ethical concern for managing Native 
American archival material, three of the protocols representing the greatest ethical 
challenges will be discussed. 
Accessibility and Use.  Accessibility and use can present one of the greatest 
challenges for researchers using archival collections.  It is the charge of the archivist or 
librarian to provide access to the collections.  The “archivist must mediate between 
offering ‘supportive collegiality’ to researchers and operating within the legal and ethical 
boundaries established by donors and the contents of literary papers.”21 This protocol 
challenges the archivist further by requesting archivists honor access and use restrictions 
requested by tribes and “recognize that the conditions under which knowledge can be 
ethically and legally acquired, archived, preserved, accessed, published, or otherwise 
used change through time.  Some materials may have been collected or later restricted by 
a donor in contravention of community rights and laws or of contemporary federal laws 
or professional ethics.  In all of these cases the rights of a Native American community 
must take precedence.”22 If the Native American community deems unrestricted material 
culturally sensitive, it will be the decision of the archivist to determine whether it is his or 
her ethical obligation to restrict the material. Archivists and librarians taught to champion 
open access and intellectual freedom to resources may be troubled by the idea that in 
Native American communities knowledge can be collectively owned.  Access to some 
knowledge may be restricted as a privilege rather than a right.23 
Culturally Sensitive Materials.  The National Historic Preservation Act allows 
federal agencies to withhold information about the location of religious and historically 
significant sites, but far more culturally sensitive materials are held in archives and 
available to the public than what this act protects.24 This material in archives is a 
particular ethical concern because to a non-Native archivist, much of this material may 
not be seen as sensitive in nature.  Archivists must understand the importance to Native 
American communities of protecting this sacred material from exploitation and misuse.  
Though definitions of culturally sensitive material will vary from group to group, the 
Protocols provide examples to guide archivists and librarians in identifying this material. 
Providing Context. It is easy to see the culturally responsive course of history in 
a library catalog.  Derogatory terms and other outdated word usages often remain, though 
frequently with references to the more accepted term.  This protocol takes into 
consideration original language and tasks the archivist with adding the explanations of 
derogatory words to original titles, removing offensive terms from original titles, and 
providing substitute words for the offensive terms.  Our vocabulary has grown and 
changed along with our cultural awareness and sense of understanding.  Maintaining 
these words, that many find offensive, is degrading.  From an ethical standpoint, 
archivists at the very least should acknowledge the derogatory nature of the words and 
provide alternatives. 
This protocol also calls for supplemental descriptive materials to accompany 
culturally sensitive material informing researchers of concerns in the community and of 
the existence of research protocols if there are any.  With these statements, the users are 
well informed of the sensitive nature of the material from the beginning and are obliged 
to treat it with care and respect. 
Ultimately, adopting the Protocols means much more work for the institution 
holding the material, so it is necessary to examine why the Protocols should be adopted.  
First, the types of culturally sensitive material held by archives and libraries will differ 
from place to place, and the tribal guidelines dictating the handling of this material will 
also differ.25 The Protocols provide a basic outline for establishing a dialogue and 
creating a cooperative effort to ensure the proper care and handling of the material.  
Though the guidelines may not be tribe-specific, they raise the concerns of the Native 
American community and create awareness among the archivists and users. 
Some believe that restricting access to research material for reasons of cultural 
sensitivity is shortsighted, political, and anti-intellectual.26 The Protocols attempt to 
combat this by building relationships with the Native American community and the 
holding institution.27 The Protocols do not seek to restrict all access to culturally sensitive 
materials, but, rather, they primarily seek their identification and respectful treatment.  
The cooperative spirit of the Protocols allows Native American consultants to help 
identify this material and take the necessary steps to ensure it is protected and used in the 
proper context. 
The affect the Protocols for Native American Archival Materials will have on the 
archival, library, and Native American community is yet to been seen.  It is important to 
note that unlike NAGPRA, the Protocols are not a legislative mandate but are simply 
guidelines for identifying and adopting best professional and ethical practices for 
“culturally responsive care and use” of Native American archival materials.28 Because of 
the voluntary nature of the Protocols, predicting the implementation and use of them is 
difficult. 
Similar protocols were adopted by the Australian organization the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Library Information and Resource Network (ATSILIRN).  The 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Protocols for Libraries, Archives and Information 
Services were published in 1995.  The impact of these protocols nearly thirteen years 
later is still uncertain.  According to the ATSILIRN website, “after a decade in 
circulation, it was recognized that there is little in the research literature that identifies the 
extent of the use of the Protocols, or their value and effectiveness in workplaces across 
the LIS sector.”29 The ATSILIRN Protocols were updated in 2005, and they reflect many 
of the same ethical concerns as the Native American Protocols. 
While the Native American Archives Roundtable of the Society of American 
Archivists (SAA) has endorsed the Protocols for Native American Archival Materials, 
the SAA at large has not endorsed the Protocols.  The Protocols were presented for 
endorsement to the SAA Council at it’s late summer meeting in 2007.  After calling for 
public comment on the Protocols in late 2007, the SAA created a Task Force to “review 
and summarize (without recommendations for action) the comments received.”30 The 
Task Force will submit a report with recommendations regarding the next steps the 
Council should take in considering the endorsement of the Protocols. 
While it is uncertain what impact an SAA endorsement will have on the 
implementation of the Protocols, all cultural institutions holding Native American 
material and culturally sensitive archival collections should endorse the Protocols.  
Institutions holding these materials should use the Protocols as a means of ethical self-
evaluation and to establish a dialogue with Native American communities.  Adopting the 
Protocols does not mean that institutions will have to restrict access to their collections or 
repatriate culturally sensitive material.  Adoption of the Protocols is an indication that the 
institution is taking a pro-active approach to fulfilling its moral and ethical obligations to 
the both Native and non-Native communities. 
Case Two. The National Archives and the Supreme Court Tapes Controversy.  
During the course of his remarks at the 2003 conference Political Pressure and the 
Archival Record, Verne Harris commented, as he so frequently does, on the inherent 
politics of recordkeeping and the constant need for awareness and activism.  His words 
are worth revisiting here: “Activists need to be wary of the penchant for those who hold 
power in democracies to hold up contract as a substitute for contest. Sometimes the 
powerful go so far as to suggest that contestation unravels the contract. These, I want to 
suggest are subterfuges, strategies for entrenching power. It is to confuse law, and right, 
with justice.”31  While Harris’s remarks are influenced by his own experiences as a 
“contestant” in South Africa, they are also informed by the notion that too often 
archivists stand as defenders of the “contract” and in turn the interests of those in power.  
Quoting Bob Dylan, Harris argues that these individuals are “trained to take what looks 
like the easy way out.”32 
This case study is unfortunately an all too perfect example of archivists who 
bowed to the will of the powerful and literally upheld “contract” in the face of “contest.”  
A discussion of the events related to Peter Irons’ public release of tapes of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s oral arguments should clarify the particular need for ethics and 
transparency in government archives as well as the need for more archivists who are not 
afraid to speak out.  Today, in 2008, anyone interested in reading a Supreme Court 
opinion or listening to a digital recording of the Court’s oral arguments is confronted with 
a wide variety of options, from commonly available databases such as Lexis-Nexis to free 
websites like Oyez and Findlaw.  CDs and book length transcripts can be found in most 
libraries and large bookstores.  Archivists had little to do with this turn of events. 
Yet as recently as the early 1990s, Supreme Court materials were hardly easy to 
obtain.  Opinions could only be accessed at law libraries or through expensive 
commercial providers.  Oral arguments were even harder to come by, distributed by one 
authorized company on a pay per view basis.33 The individual justices who spoke were 
not even identified in these transcripts.34 Video cameras were, as they still are, certainly 
not permitted, and due to space limitations, even those who traveled to Washington and 
stood in line outside the courtroom rarely got to listen in for more than a few minutes 
before giving up their seat to the next person in line.35 
Few people knew that since October of 1955 the Supreme Court had been 
recording its proceedings for internal use and depositing these tapes in the National 
Archives.  Up until 1986, any researcher was free to request copies from the master reels 
and use them without restriction.  This policy changed, however, after Fred Graham of 
CBS News broadcast portions of the Pentagon Papers case on radio and television for the 
case’s fifteenth anniversary.36 Then Chief Justice Warren Burger was furious and 
demanded that the FBI investigate how Graham had obtained the recordings.  When 
Burger realized they were freely available at the National Archives, he convinced 
Archives staff to limit access to only those who agreed to sign a statement that they 
would use the tapes “for private research and teaching purposes only.”37 
No one seemingly defied Burger’s wishes until political science professor Peter 
Irons visited the National Archives around 1991.  As the director of the Earl Warren Bill 
of Rights project at the University of California, San Diego, Irons was looking for 
innovative teaching materials that would readily resonate with students.  After the 
publication of his 1988 book, The Courage of Their Convictions, which is based on 
interviews with individuals involved in Bill of Rights cases argued before the Supreme 
Court, the professor was overwhelmed with positive responses from teachers and 
students, who praised the book’s first-person accounts.38 Irons wanted to produce 
something that would “bring the Bill of Rights to life” in much the same way,39 and he 
recalled the experience of listening to the 1958 case, Kent v. Dulles, in an appellate 
advocacy class at Harvard Law School in 1978.40 Recognizing their educational potential, 
Irons sought out the Supreme Court tapes at the National Archives with the intention of 
editing them and adding commentary for widespread classroom use. 
Before he arrived at the National Archives and was asked to sign the agreement, 
Irons had no knowledge of the restrictions on the tapes.  “I considered [the restrictions] 
unenforceable and a violation of the First Amendment,” Irons later remarked.  “These 
were public records, not classified or subject to the Privacy Act.”  He considered suing 
the Archives on First Amendment grounds, but decided instead to take his chances, sign 
the restrictions agreement, and proceed with his plans to market the tapes.41 
Still, in an attempt to gain the Court’s approval, Irons sent copies of the edited 
tapes to several current and former members.  Then Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s 
administrative assistant, Robb Jones, responded in a letter on the justice’s behalf, giving 
his consent and hearty approval.  Jones wrote, “I applaud the concept and your efforts.  I 
know [the tapes] will contribute to educators’ and the public’s understanding of the 
Court’s role and the function of oral arguments.”42 Emboldened, Irons made 
arrangements with a non-profit publisher to distribute excerpts from 23 landmark cases 
such as Miranda v. Arizona and Roe v. Wade in a book and on audio cassettes. 
 May It Please the Court was first published in August of 1993 to the Supreme 
Court’s immediate and extremely public disapproval.  In a quick reversal on Jones’s 
earlier letter to Irons, the Court’s public information officer released a statement pointing 
to the agreement the professor signed at the National Archives.  Toni House, Supreme 
Court press officer, followed up with a threat of legal action: “In light of these clear 
violations of Professor Irons’ contractual commitments, the Court is considering what 
legal remedies may be appropriate.”43 
Press coverage over the next few weeks predominantly favored the wide release 
of the tapes, if not always Peter Irons himself.  Former Solicitor General, Charles P. 
Fried, charged Irons with “gross dishonesty” for his violation of the Archives’ 
restrictions,44 and a New York Times editorial observed misidentifications in the May It 
Please the Court transcripts and accused Irons and his co-editor, Stephanie Guitton, of 
“sloppy work and dubious judgment.”45 Nevertheless, most commentators focused on the 
weaknesses of the agreement Irons signed and criticized the Court’s demands for secrecy.  
A Washington Post editorial noted that the recordings and transcripts are in the public 
domain and likened them to Congressional records: “[The material] was produced by the 
government, using taxpayer funds, on government time, and it should be available to the 
public.”46 William Safire of The New York Times colorfully expressed the same 
sentiment:  “Public officials with their heads in the 19th century think they can keep 
public records from commercial exploitation by limiting their use to ‘scholarly research.’ 
That’s like being a little bit pregnant; as the Dead Sea Scroll monopolists learned,47 
unless a public document or tape or photo is a national secret or an invasion of privacy, it 
should be and will be available for dissemination in any way the market system decides. 
Tapes -- yesterday audio, tomorrow video -- of open Court argument are the public’s 
property, not the personal trusts of the justices. If I want to photograph the Declaration of 
Independence and sell it on a t-shirt, that’s my business, not the National Archives’s.”48 
Faced with this sharp and logical criticism, the National Archives failed at this 
point to make any appropriate, public response.  On September 24th, The Washington 
Post reported that the Court’s marshal, Alfred Wong, had told Acting Archivist of the 
United States Trudy H. Peterson in a recent letter to not give Peter Irons anymore copies 
of the tapes without the permission of the Court.  Cited in the same story, an Archives 
spokeswoman acknowledges that as a caretaker of the Court’s documents, the National 
Archives will follow Wong’s instructions.49 The National Archives said nothing more 
officially until the Court yielded to press scrutiny on November 1st and requested the 
removal of all restrictions on the tapes.50  
Peter Irons went on to produce three more May It Please the Court sets on the 
issues of abortion, the First Amendment, and education respectively.51 The Supreme 
Court has adapted somewhat over the years and now posts transcripts and recordings to 
its own official website and even issued an audio broadcast of the oral arguments in Bush 
v. Gore to be played on radio and television.  Still, the judiciary remains the most 
secretive and least understood branch of the federal government,52 and in the fifteen years 
since the Peter Irons tapes controversy, no one in the archival community has really 
discussed the appalling actions (or non-actions rather) of the National Archives in this 
case. 
In his testimony to a 2005 Senate hearing on the use of video cameras in the 
courtroom, Peter Irons maintained that the Archives staff initially opposed Warren 
Burger’s demand for restrictions in 1986 but conceded when the chief justice threatened 
to withhold all future tapes.53 One might imagine that a similar threat motivated the 
National Archives in 1993 or simply a more generalized fear of alienating the Court.  
Perhaps the Archives resisted the idea of suddenly backing down on a restrictions 
agreement they had so recently been upholding without objection. 
Yet as William Safire contended with his allusions to the Dead Sea Scrolls and 
Declaration of Independence t-shirts, the problem with all this is that the tapes were, of 
course, public records.  Anyone should have been able use them without restriction for 
purposes educational, commercial, or otherwise.  The Supreme Court is a governmental 
body, not a private donor whose wishes and privacy must be taken into account.54 The 
National Archives’ decision to follow the Court’s directives and fail to defend the 
public’s right to know flies in the face of the ethical standards of the archival 
profession.55 Singling out Peter Irons and not allowing him alone to make copies of the 
tapes without the permission of the Court is an indisputable example of unequal access. 
The National Archives’ deference to the Supreme Court stands in stark contrast to 
the Library of Congress’s dealings with the Court earlier that year in a remarkably similar 
case.  When former justice Thurgood Marshall died in January of 1993, less than two 
years after leaving the bench, his personal papers were immediately opened to 
researchers at the Library according to the terms of his deed of gift.  On May 24th, The 
Washington Post published two articles, which heavily drew upon Marshall’s papers, and 
in the days that followed, the Library of Congress was attacked from all sides.  
Marshall’s family, friends, former clerks, and colleagues voiced their opinion that 
Marshall would have never wanted his papers opened so soon.  They also questioned the 
Library’s decision to allow journalists to access the papers, noting that the deed of gift 
specified that they were to be used “by scholars or researchers engaged in serious 
research.”56 On May 26th, William Rehnquist sent an open letter to Librarian of Congress 
James H. Billington and claimed to speak for a majority of the Court’s current members.  
In the letter, Rehnquist boldly suggests that the Library should have consulted with the 
Supreme Court before opening the papers “given the Court’s long tradition of 
confidentiality in its deliberations” and declares that “future donors of judicial papers will 
be inclined to look elsewhere for a repository.”57 
Despite the attacks from individuals as prominent as Rehnquist, the Librarian of 
Congress refused to back down, defending his position that Marshall fully understood his 
agreement with the Library and that all adults, including journalists, can be engaged in 
serious research.  He arranged meetings with Rehnquist and the Marshall family to 
explain the language and circumstances of the donor agreement58 and released a detailed 
statement to the press.  In the statement, Billington expresses his sympathy with all 
parties involved but insists that any attempt to limit access “is a breach of contract and a 
violation of the trust placed in the Library by the donor.”59 The library community rallied 
behind Billington.  The editor of Library Journal published an editorial commending the 
Library of Congress and any efforts to encourage open government,60 and the ALA 
passed a resolution on June 30th supporting access to the Marshall papers and the notion 
that journalistic research is serious research.61 
The Library of Congress’s reaction to criticism over the Marshall papers is a 
model for how the National Archives should have responded to the Supreme Court’s 
requests for restrictions on the oral argument recordings.  In cases such as these (the 
Marshall papers, the Dead Sea Scrolls) the archivist or librarian’s best bet is to take the 
case to the press.  The absurdity of overzealous restrictions can rarely withstand public 
scrutiny (or so we can only hope).  As Richard Cox and David Wallace observe in their 
introduction to the collection Archives and the Public Good,  
Archivists and records managers need to move well beyond their traditional 
notion of advocacy in which the public and policymakers gain an appreciation for 
archives and records to making them understand and support the essential reason 
that records are created, how they need to be maintained, and what makes them 
significant.62  
In other words, archivists have a duty to educate the public wholeheartedly and stand up 
for ethics and transparency in recordkeeping.  This is the only way they will build trust in 
the work they do. Archivists certainly cannot expect all their researchers to be like Peter 
Irons and to speak out for them on issues of accountability. 
In both the Irons and Marshall cases, the actual records and documents showed 
the Supreme Court in a remarkably favorable light, as dedicated individuals who 
comprehend the serious and far-reaching repercussions of their decisions.  If the National 
Archives was not able to withstand the Court’s pressure on relatively positive and clearly 
public materials, how can we expect this institution to speak out on more controversial or 
even classified documentation?  This worry is compounded today by the excessive 
secrecy of the post-9/11 political environment, an environment in which whistleblowers 
face the continuing threat of retribution. 
In his 2007 book Nation of Secrets, Ted Gup compares information to water.  
“Secrecy,” Gup writes, ”...arrests the natural flow of information.  Like water, even vast 
amounts of information can be restrained.  But over time, its impoundment erodes 
democracy and ultimately threatens it with collapse.”63  Archivists, librarians, and records 
managers, particularly those working within the government, should be prepared to ease, 
not hinder, this “natural flow of information,” even if it means taking risks and standing 
up to the powerful.  As Verne Harris has said, “I refuse to turn my back on higher 
callings, and I encourage everyone in archives to make the same refusal…we are 
guaranteed the self-respect that comes from a refusal to seek the easy way out.”64 
Case Three. The Archival Response to the “Lost” White House E-Mail.  For 
obvious reasons, the importance of records is a major theme within archival literature. 
Selection, appraisal, organization, and preservation of documentary material are common 
topics of discussion among both archivists and records managers. The need to provide 
access to records is also clearly recognized within professional discourse. Indeed, the 
emphasis placed upon access and related issues only serves to underscore a rhetorical 
commitment to freedom of information and government accountability.  
 Nevertheless, as of this writing, the archival profession has been largely silent 
regarding the mysterious disappearance of e-mail generated by the Bush administration. 
This is, in some ways, not a great surprise. For although deliberate destruction of material 
by corporate or government actors is universally denounced by archivists, relatively little 
substantive action has historically resulted on the part of the profession in response to 
specific examples of malfeasance. To be sure, a few individual archivists are speaking 
out against the Bush administration.65 However, because the material involved in the 
White House e-mail scandal is clearly protected by federal legislation, and considering 
the potentially devastating impact of such an erasure on the historical record, the 
passivity on the part of the archival profession as a whole is extremely troubling. 
 While archivists have generally proven quick to recognize real or perceived 
threats to professional interests, they have often been slow to act to in defense of core 
values, as can be seen in the case of the missing White House e-mail. Although the 
destruction or suppression of Bush White House e-mail might initially appear to be a 
distinct problem, it is, on the contrary, inextricably intertwined with other contemporary 
controversies. Knowledge of the missing e-mail first emerged during an investigation into 
whether the Bush administration deliberately exposed the identity of a covert CIA 
officer.66 While the White House has consistently denied accusations of deliberate 
destruction, certain patterns are clearly evident. For instance, extended periods of missing 
e-mail just happen to coincide with the invasion of Iraq and Hurricane Katrina, two of the 
more notable disasters of the Bush era.67 E-mail has also been lost for dates when the 
White House was subject to court orders to either preserve or turn over such documents.68  
Of particular significance for the archivist, by using non-government e-mail 
accounts the Bush administration deliberately and systematically evaded restrictions 
established by the Presidential Records Act (PRA).69 The existence of a parallel e-mail 
system funded by the Republican National Committee (RNC) and regularly used by 
many top White House staff was first revealed by Congress in April 2007.70 Knowledge 
of the existence of a parallel e-mail system that was regularly used by certain White 
House staff was first acknowledged by Congress in April 2007. Despite evidence to the 
contrary, the Bush administration initially claimed that it did not use e-mail accounts and 
equipment provided by the Republican National Committee (RNC) in an official 
government capacity.71 The White House further insisted that it did not consider this 
“electronic back channel”72 as a means to disguise political activity. However, the Justice 
Department was eventually forced to turn over evidence that, despite its prior 
protestations, the Bush administration had used the RNC e-mail accounts during 
discussion of the firing of a group of U.S. Attorney’s General.73 The White House 
initially failed to turn over such records, claiming that they had either not been properly 
archived by the e-mail software or simply failed to turn up during routine searches.74 
White House staff members were almost certainly aware that the RNC was not in the 
habit of preserving e-mail sent through its servers.75 
Alarmed by White House behavior, the House Oversight and Government Affairs 
Committee eventually expanded its investigation.76 By mid-April 2007, the White House 
was forced to acknowledge that at least five million e-mails from its own system had 
been either lost or destroyed.77 Even in the face of widespread skepticism, the Bush 
administration has consistently blamed technical glitches or archiving anomalies for the 
huge volume of missing e-mail.78 The White House has, for instance, often claimed that 
the e-mails were lost during a conversion from Lotus Notes to Microsoft Outlook which 
was completed in 2003.79 
Even more problematic, the White House claimed that it recycled and reused e-
mail backup tapes until late 2003, in the process likely destroying many records created 
prior to that time.80 From a technical standpoint, the practice of recording over backup 
tapes makes little sense because such media is too inexpensive for recycling to be 
feasible.81 In any case, the backup tapes used by the White House did not capture all e-
mail sent and were not considered reliable or sufficient for meeting federal records 
laws.82  
Although the White House claims it had stopped recycling tapes by October 2003, 
e-mail created after that time has also disappeared.83 Indeed, for some dates no e-mails 
sent by White House staff have been preserved at all.84 At one point, as many as 473 
separate days with at least some missing e-mail were identified.85 This is difficult to 
comprehend since the White House logs up to 100,000 e-mails per day, all of which are 
required to be preserved by either the PRA or the Federal Records Act (FRA).86 By late 
February 2008, the estimated number of days with missing e-mail had been reduced to 
202, a significant decrease but still an astonishing number.87 The problem appears to be 
widespread within the Bush administration. The Office of the Vice President, for 
example, lost some of its e-mail from 2003-2005,88 and other digital records may have 
similarly gone missing.89 
As of February 2008, the Bush White House still did not have an archival quality 
records-management system in place to organize and retain electronic communications.90 
For some time, in fact, the Bush administration continued to rely upon a program 
requiring e-mail to be manually copied, saved, and stored.91 Such a system, apart from 
being decidedly archaic, is acutely vulnerable to manipulation or abuse. Indeed, until at 
least mid-2005 anyone using the White House network could easily access, modify, or 
delete e-mail.92 
Although no indisputable evidence of illegal action has so far been uncovered, the 
e-mail scandal, as some have noted, contains at least “a whiff of Watergate.”93 Due to 
what can only be described as negligence, incompetence, or deceit, millions of records 
documenting the most controversial events of the last eight years may be lost forever. 
The resistance of the Bush administration is only compounded by the fact that in late 
February 2008 the RNC announced, without further explanation, that it had ceased 
searching for White House e-mail on its servers and had no plans to perform any future 
work.94 
While the White House e-mail scandal has received its share of attention in the 
press, relatively little public outrage has been evident. This might be explained by the fact 
that the story has been gradually unfolding over a long period of time and has never 
reached any sort of critical political mass.  Public reaction to this particular White House 
scandal may also derive from the reality that e-mail is now an extraordinarily socialized 
technology. The peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of e-mail are well established in public 
discourse. Anyone who has ever used an e-mail program has accidentally deleted, 
misfiled, or otherwise misplaced an important message. Even though the number of e-
mails lost by the White House is staggering, news of similar episodes is now almost 
commonplace. Indeed, the disappearance of e-mail in government or corporate spheres 
has become rather ordinary and “few days pass now without news about another major 
breach of data privacy, illegal destruction of data, or the inability to find historic data.”95 
Although one might anticipate that controversy involving a tool as popular and 
familiar as e-mail would pique the public interest, it seems that the opposite has in fact 
been the case. Paradoxically, the growth and spread of e-mail has seemingly made 
Americans less concerned about its abuse by corporate or government officials. Eight 
years ago it was estimated that Americans sent approximately 60 billion e-mails per 
year.96 By 2007 that number had reached almost 9 trillion.97 E-mail can now be sent, 
received, and deleted from a variety of portable devices. This convenience has 
contributed to the sheer volume of e-mail and also made communications technology an 
ever more integrated facet of American life. Indeed, modern society is characterized by 
“pervasive computing”98 resulting in an exponential increase in the creation and 
dissemination of digital material. Few people have noticed, or at least spent much time 
lamenting, the disappearance of the pay telephone in response to the evolution of cellular 
technology. It may be similarly difficult for people to be outraged by the loss of e-mail 
messages when such records are considered so ordinary and ephemeral. 
Although the difficulties faced by the Bush White House might appear 
exceptional, this is certainly not the first administration to have difficulty preserving its 
own e-mail. In fact, every presidential administration that has used electronic mail since 
it was first installed in the White House during the early 1980’s has lost, attempted to 
destroy, or somehow manipulated the resultant records.99 The Iran-contra scandal, for 
example, essentially revolved around the failed destruction of e-mail recording illegal and 
unconstitutional activity by some of President Reagan’s closest advisors. The Reagan 
White House also attempted to erase e-mail backup tapes during its last week in office, an 
action that may have threatened up to 7 million records.100 The succeeding administration 
tried to keep control of its e-mail through a secret agreement with the Archivist of the 
United States, in clear violation of the Presidential Records Act.101 Such efforts even 
included enlisting government employees to cart off backup tapes in the hours shortly 
before the inauguration of the next president.102 
The Clinton administration was forced via court order to adopt the Automated 
Records Management System (ARMS) during the mid-1990’s.103 Even though ARMS 
featured preservation safeguards and automatic archiving, the Clinton administration still 
experienced trouble retaining e-mail.104 At one point, as many as two million messages 
sent by the Clinton White House were thought to have been lost or destroyed,105 though 
the majority of these records were eventually recovered.106 Despite some initial bugs, 
ARMS was known to be working effectively when the Bush administration took over in 
2001.107 
There is a popular tendency in current-day political discourse to idealize the 
Clinton years as a period of relative enlightenment, particularly when compared to the 
cynical paranoia of the Bush era. However, it must be recognized that the Clinton White 
House, following precedent set by the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, 
similarly argued that e-mail was not covered by federal legislation.108 The Clinton 
administration even attempted to place White House e-mail beyond the reach of Freedom 
of Information Act requests.109 
What this suggests is that the attitude of presidential administrations toward e-
mail has less to do with party affiliation than with a desire to control information. E-mail 
was intended partly to replace White House telephone conversations that did not 
necessarily leave any record.110 The fear of committing official business to e-mail, which 
by law must be preserved, has had a dramatic impact on officials who fear that their 
words and actions may be misinterpreted. This is, in many ways, an understandable 
reaction and one that resonates within the public consciousness. We have all sent e-mails 
containing words, ideas, or sentiments that we would not want publicly broadcast or 
which removed from their proper context could be easily misconstrued. However, as the 
behavior of the Bush administration demonstrates, it is only a small step from trying to 
maintain discretion to deliberate evasion. 
The fact that the power to form or control the historical record now lays in the 
hands of partisan White House functionaries should be a cause for serious alarm among 
the archival profession, whether the sitting administration is Republican or Democrat. It 
will not do to wait for public outcry to reach a crescendo before we respond. Archivists 
and records-managers can offer unique insight into this particular scandal since we have 
been grappling with the ethical challenges of electronic records, not to mention the 
records themselves, for decades.  
In fact, the behavior of the Bush administration in this case would seem to 
represent a golden opportunity for archivists to publicly assert themselves. Yet, 
throughout the course of the controversy, there has been little apparent activity among the 
archival community. Although the website of the Society of American Archivists (SAA) 
is not entirely devoid of signs of political awareness, there is little acknowledgement of 
the e-mail scandal.111 Neither the International Council of Archivists (ICA) nor the 
Academy of Certified Archivists (ACA) appears to have taken much notice of the lost 
White House e-mail.112 Discussion of White House e-mail on the Archives and Archivist 
listserv has been sporadic, abbreviated, and mostly carried on by a few interested 
individuals.113 
In contrast, the National Security Archive (NSA) has not only documented the 
scandal blow-by-blow, it has also taken direct action to counter the destruction of White 
House e-mail.114 Although the NSA performs some basic archival functions, it is not 
exactly part of the mainstream archival community. Its actions have, by and large, been 
conducted in conjunction with other whistleblower or watchdog groups and without the 
overt assistance of professional archival organizations.  For the most part, the archival 
profession appears content to wait for its expertise to be recognized and its opinions 
solicited by society at large. But if archivists are to be effective advocates for the 
historical record, then they must be willing, if necessary, to raise their voices within 
ongoing social, cultural, and political discussions.  
It is not unreasonable to expect archivists to assert themselves in the political 
sphere, since at various times in the past they have, in fact, demonstrated a willingness to 
act in defense of professional values. During the Reagan administration, the SAA was 
part of a diverse coalition of professional organizations that successfully lobbied 
Congress to remove the National Archives from the authority of the General Services 
Administration.115 The SAA later joined the American Historical Association and the 
Organization of American Historians in criticizing President Clinton’s nominee to lead 
the National Archives and Records Administration.116 More recently, the SAA was 
included in an amici curiae brief filed as part of an appeal seeking to compel the current 
Vice President to disclose members of an energy policy task force.117 
However, greater coordination and organization is necessary for sustained activity 
to be optimally effective. It seems unlikely that the SAA will soon be transformed into a 
politically dynamic organization. At present it may be more reasonable for American 
archivists to consider forming new groups designed for more explicitly political purposes. 
One interesting suggestion that has already been offered is the creation of an archival 
think-tank to facilitate professional research and discussion on certain vital issues.118 Such 
a body could form the intellectual foundation for lobbying state and federal officials, 
disseminating information needed to pursue a larger political agenda, and establishing 
common cause with other similarly minded organizations.  
An archival think-tank would function, in essence, as an information 
clearinghouse for the profession, thereby helping to coordinate a unified and coherent 
response to crucial issues. The think-tank could in many ways emulate professional 
organizations such as the SAA while adhering to a more fundamentally political or 
advocacy-oriented agenda such as that followed by the NSA. Cooperation with groups 
such as the SAA, ACA, and ICA would be encouraged, though not considered a 
necessary requirement for action. Affiliation with a university would probably be helpful, 
as it has been for the NSA, but if necessary an “Institute for Information and 
Democracy,”119 by whatever formal title, could also function as an independent 
professional organization. Although such a group would not be embraced by the entire 
archival community, it is an idea worthy of further exploration by those who see a need 
for greater socio-political action. 
One final factor to consider as an explanation for the relatively muted popular 
reaction to the White House e-mail controversy is simply an overwhelming sense of 
scandal-fatigue. Compared to some of the other problems the Bush White House has 
generated, missing e-mail, no matter how voluminous, may just not register on the 
outrage meter. In addition, the e-mail scandal is a convoluted, complex, and far from 
glamorous tale. Despite its Nixonian overtones, there is no single villain to focus upon 
and, as yet, no “smoking C-drive”120 providing definitive evidence of wrongdoing. 
In any event, legal and legislative efforts to hold the Bush Administration 
accountable for the loss or destruction of email have proved largely ineffective. While 
Congress has demonstrated a willingness to seek greater authority over White House 
communications, it is not clear if the political will exists to hold future members of the 
Executive branch accountable.121 Of equal importance, in June of 2008, a lawsuit filed by 
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington under the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) was dismissed in federal district court.122 The decision of the court 
constituted an endorsement of Bush Administration claims that the Office of 
Administration (OA) for the Executive Office of the President (EOP) does not qualify as 
a government agency and is therefore beyond the reach of the FOIA. This rather curious 
ruling was made despite the fact that the OA had not only been previously recognized but 
had explicitly identified itself as an agency of the EOP.123 Even though other pending 
lawsuits may produce decisions less favorable to the Bush Administration, it appears that 
many in the judicial and legal spheres have at least tacitly accepted White House 
insistence that the fundamental cause of the lost email lies with technological limitations 
rather than deliberate illegal activity.124  
Although such excuses are both plausible and effective, archivists, records-
managers, and information technology professionals understand that it is not impossible 
to competently manage the email correspondence of an organization the size of the 
EOP.125 Unfortunately, the passage of time will most likely ensure that recovery of the 
lost White House email becomes increasingly difficult and that public interest in the 
matter will fade even beyond the current level of indifference. Nevertheless, there is no 
reason to assume that the historical narrative preferred by the Bush Administration must 
dominate future discussion of the years 2001-2008. If archivists truly subscribe to the 
ethical values articulated by professional organizations such as the SAA, then we will 
make certain that the historical legacy of the Bush Administration includes an explicit 
recognition of deliberate attempts to use the vagaries of information technology to hide or 
destroy vital records.  
In the future, archivists must never tire of reminding the American people that the 
behavior of the Bush White House in regards to its own email is indicative of a 
fundamental hostility to the democratic ideals of government transparency and freedom 
of information.  Indeed, the loss or destruction of e-mail is not an isolated instance but 
merely one piece of a comprehensive assault by the Bush White House on the ability of 
the American people to hold their government accountable. The current administration 
has consistently resisted compliance to open records laws, doing so only after exhausting 
every possible appeal and then often releasing material that is heavily redacted and 
essentially useless.126 George W. Bush has asserted executive privilege in order to 
undermine federal investigations and prevent members of his administration from 
testifying before Congress.127 The Bush administration has, in short, deliberately chosen 
to operate in secrecy and avoid contemporary accountability. Historians will similarly be 
unable to critically evaluate George W. Bush if he leaves no records intact or otherwise 
accessible. This hostility strikes at the very heart of the archival mission and requires an 
unequivocal and unambiguous professional response. 
Conclusion: Lessons and Themes.  There are a variety of lessons emerging from 
these three cases, and in this conclusion we mention some worth considering (and we are 
sure there are others readers of this essay might also identify).  Perhaps the most obvious 
point is that the very nature of what archivists used to think of as security, the nuts and 
bolts of protecting historical and other documentary sources in a fashion that still allows 
them to be used, is broadening.  Now archivists must think of security as encompassing 
ethical and accountability issues as well, where the documentary heritage (real and 
potential) is under siege by the powers and principalities of the world.  While archivists 
have worried that the technologies of recordkeeping will have undermined the creation 
and maintenance of information and documentary sources with continuing value to 
society, its institutions, and various disciplines needing these sources, it is also the case 
that there are challenges posed by the weak authority or will of archivists to withstand 
political, business, economic, and other agendas requiring the destruction (or non-
creation) of records.  A quarter-of-a-century ago Joan Hoff-Wilson, considering the value 
of professional ethics codes, suggested that these codes “can be compared to locking the 
barn door after the horse has escaped, since most are adopted after serious problems of 
standards have already developed within a profession.”128 Archivists have continued to 
worry about their ethics, while supporting codes that are merely advisory and often 
vague, even as the challenges to these ethics have intensified.  What is now at risk is the 
very security of a future documentary heritage, and this reminds us that the world is 
increasingly encroaching on what many attracted to the archival profession thought of as 
their quiet place to work in caring for archival and historical materials. 
Another powerful lesson, then, from cases such as these, might be the 
increasingly uncomfortable position archivists find themselves in.  Even in the most 
seemingly benign of functions, such as assisting researchers to use the holdings of 
archival repositories, archivists find themselves in a labyrinth of conflicting laws, 
policies, and procedures.  When Allison-Bunnell, more than a decade ago, reflected on 
the intellectual property issues of literary manuscripts, she concluded that the generally 
appropriate conservative actions of archivists could be questioned: “But if these 
conservative interpretations restrict researchers’ access to valuable documents by 
preventing the limited and reasonable dissemination of those documents, the 
interpretations must be viewed with suspicion.”129  In the short time that has passed such 
intellectual property concerns have become much more complicated and dangerous.  
Now, perhaps, archivists face an insecure future in their ability to perform even the most 
basic chores. 
Given this, then, one might think that a new and more rigorous archival leadership 
would have emerged, but these cases suggest otherwise.  Most archivists, if interviewed 
about the matter of professional leadership, would probably have a hard time identifying 
who and what comprises this leadership.  Miller, two decades in his case study of the FBI 
threat to the control of archival sources, candidly stated, “if a similar case comes before 
the courts again the Society of American Archivists should not sit on the sidelines.”130  
The evidence suggests, however, that not much has changed, although there have been 
occasional flashes by this professional association of stepping out to be a more vocal 
proponent in controversial archival issues.  Perhaps, no one should be surprised by this.  
Herman Kahn, reviewing four decades ago the contentious charges of historian Francis 
Loewenheim, commenced his essay in this way: “It is appropriate to begin this discussion 
by reminding ourselves that libraries and archives are operated by human beings, not by 
angels.”131  We have even more evidence today that this is the case. The issue remains, 
however, in how archivists re-invent their notion of professional ethics and accountability 
to form a new sense of archival security. 
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